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Abstract
Hypothesis testing is a central statistical method in psychological research and the
cognitive sciences. While the problems of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST)
have been debated widely, few attractive alternatives exist. In this paper, we provide a
tutorial on the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and the e-value, which is a fully
Bayesian alternative to traditional significance tests which rely on p-values. The FBST
is an advanced methodological procedure which can be applied to several areas. In
this tutorial, we showcase with two examples of widely used statistical methods in
psychological research how the FBST can be used in practice, provide researchers with
explicit guidelines on how to conduct it and make available R-code to reproduce all
results. The FBST is an innovative method which has clearly demonstrated to perform
better than frequentist significance testing. However, to our best knowledge, it has not
been used so far in the psychological sciences and should be of wide interest to a broad
range of researchers in psychology and the cognitive sciences.
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Hypothesis testing is a central statistical method in psychological research. While the
problems of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) have been debated widely, few
attractive alternatives exist for practitioners. In this paper, we provide a tutorial on the Full
Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and the e-value, which is a fully Bayesian alternative
to traditional significance tests. We show that the FBST is an advanced methodological
procedure which can be applied to several areas of psychological research. Two examples
of widely used statistical methods in psychological research highlight how the FBST can
be used in practice, and we provide researchers with explicit guidelines how to conduct
it by providing R-code to reproduce all results and analyses. The FBST is an innovative
method which has clearly demonstrated to perform better than frequentist significance
testing. However, to our best knowledge, it has not been used so far in the psychological
sciences and should be of wide interest to a broad range of researchers in psychology.
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The last century has brought the advent of multiple proposals on how to test a research
hypothesis statistically (Howie, 2002). Well-known examples include the theory of signifi-
cance testing employing p-values, formally introduced by British statistician Ronald Fisher
(Fisher, 1925) and the theory of uniformly most powerful tests of Neyman and Pearson
(1933). While both theories can differ substantially in the application and obtained results
(Cox, 1958), they are unified by being located under the umbrella of the frequentist sta-
tistical philosophy (Mayo, 2018). The more recent replication crisis in psychology and its
relationship to the frequentist paradigm, in particular, has been discussed widely in the last
decade (Center for Open Science, 2020; Colquhoun, 2014; Pashler & Harris, 2012). While
the problems of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and p-values have been anal-
ysed and detailed in various articles (Colquhoun, 2016, 2017; Greenland, 2019; Greenland
et al., 2016), the experienced reproducibility issues are far from being solved (Ioannidis,
2019; Matthews, Wasserstein, & Spiegelhalter, 2017).
In general, among the proposed solutions to the observed problems with NHST and
p-values is a trend for the increased use of Bayesian data analysis (Wasserstein & Lazar,
2016; Wasserstein, Schirm, & Lazar, 2019). Narrowing the scope to psychological research,
there is an increasing trend of proposals which recommend a shift towards Bayesian statis-
tics, in particular towards Bayesian hypothesis testing (Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016;
Rouder, 2014; Wagenmakers, Morey, & Lee, 2016). Often, these proposals centre on the
Bayes factor as a replacement for traditional p-values (Hoijtink, Mulder, van Lissa, & Gu,
2019; Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010), and emphasize the benefits
of Bayesian interval estimates over traditional confidence intervals (Kruschke & Liddell,
2018a; Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Wagenmakers, Gronau, Dab-
lander, & Etz, 2020). However, there are also discussions about the benefits of applying
Bayesian data analysis in meta-analysis or clinical trials (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b).
Considering a wider timeframe for a moment reveals that Bayesian mathematical psy-
chology has become more popular in the last decades in general. Van De Schoot, Winter,
Ryan, Zondervan-Zwijnenburg, and Depaoli (2017) conducted an extensive systematic re-
view which included n = 1579 Bayesian psychologic articles published between 1990 and
2015, and concluded that Bayesian statistics “is used in a variety of contexts across sub-
fields of psychology and related disciplines.” (Van De Schoot et al., 2017, p. 1). They
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underlined that
“There are many different reasons why one might choose to use Bayes (e.g., the
use of priors, estimating otherwise intractable models, modeling uncertainty,
etc.). We found in this review that the use of Bayes has increased and broad-
ened in the sense that this methodology can be used in a flexible manner to
tackle many different forms of questions.”
(Van De Schoot et al., 2017, p. 1)
However, while there is a trend which favours Bayesian data analysis over frequentist
solutions in mathematical psychology (Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018), there are also critical
voices. Tendeiro and Kiers (2019) recently reviewed some issues about the practice of
Bayesian hypothesis testing via Bayes factors which are often advocated in the literature
Morey, Romeijn, and Rouder (2016). Among the problems discussed are (1) the sensitivity
of Bayes factors to within-model priors (Kamary, Mengersen, Robert, & Rousseau, 2014;
Kelter, 2020b; Robert, 2016), (2) the requirement of mathematically advanced numerical
methods for the computation of Bayes factors like the Savage-Dickey density ratio method
(Dickey & Lientz, 1970; Verdinelli & Wasserman, 1995; Wagenmakers et al., 2010) or bridge
sampling (Gronau et al., 2017; Gronau, Wagenmakers, Heck, & Matzke, 2019), and (3) the
fact that the thresholds for interpreting Bayes factors are similarly arbitrary as the signifi-
cance levels used on frequentist hypothesis tests (Tendeiro & Kiers, 2019). For more details
on these issues see Tendeiro and Kiers (2019). Other authors even argue in favour of NHST
and p-values and only criticise that practitioners use and interpret them inappropriately
(Greenland, 2019). Recent results also have shown that there are various other Bayesian
indices as the Bayes factor for significance and the size of an effect, some of which have ap-
pealing theoretical and practical properties (Kelter, 2020a; Makowski, Ben-Shachar, Chen,
& Lu¨decke, 2019). This situation shows that it is useful to widen the scope in the discussion
about statistical significance when it comes to Bayesian hypothesis testing.
In summary, the existing literature indicates that there is no trivial solution to the
methodological status quo, which in psychology is still based on NHST and p-values
(Matthews et al., 2017), and it is not the goal of this paper to join the discussion “Bayes
factors vs. p-values” for hypothesis testing in psychological research. Instead, the goal of
this paper is to draw attention to a statistical method which has despite its various appeal-
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ing properties – to the author’s best knowledge – not been applied in psychology so far.
While it offers an appealing alternative to contemporary statistical approaches to hypoth-
esis testing, the roots of the procedure date back more than two decades and it has been
applied successfully in a wide range of scientific areas to the present date.
1 The Full Bayesian Significance Test
1.1 The philosophy behind the FBST
This section outlines the theory of the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and the e-value,
which enjoys desirable properties and is easy to apply in practice. The Full Bayesian Sig-
nificance Test was developed more than two decades ago by Pereira and Stern (1999) as
a fully Bayesian alternative to traditional frequentist null hypothesis significance tests. It
was designed to test a sharp (or precise) point null hypothesis H0 against its alternative
H1.
According to Cox et al. (1977) and Kempthorne (1976), a significance test is defined as
a method which measures the consistency of data with a null hypothesis H0. Frequentist
hypothesis tests use p-values which are based on the idea of ordering the sample space
according to increasing inconsistency with the hypothesis. In contrast, the e-value used
in the FBST is based on the idea of ordering the parameter space according to increasing
inconsistency with observed data (Pereira, Stern, & Wechsler, 2008). Traditional frequentist
significance testing employs the p-value to reject the null hypothesis H0:
p = Pr(x ∈ C|θ0)
Here, often C := {x ∈ X |Tθ0(x) ≥ tobs} is the set of sample space values x ∈ X for which
a test statistic Tθ0 under assumption of the null hypothesis value θ0 is at least as large
as the test statistic value tobs calculated from the observed data. The set C is, in general,
interpreted as the sample space values x ∈ X which are at least as inconsistent with the null
hypothesis value θ0 as the observed data, and the p-value quantifies the evidence against
H0 by calculating the probability over this set (Casella & Berger, 2002; Held & Sabane´s
Bove´, 2014; Pereira et al., 2008).
(Pereira et al., 2008, p. 80) argued that a Bayesian should look at the so-called tangential
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set T of parameter points which are more consistent with the data x than θ0, that is at ev =
1− ev, where
ev = Pr(θ ∈ T |x)
Here, ev is interpreted as the evidence in favour of H0, while ev is interpreted as the ev-
idence against H0, which is the probability of all parameter values θ in the parameter
space Θ that are more consistent with the data x than the null value θ0. The philosophy of
the FBST is, in summary, based on constructing a duality between sampling theories and
Bayesian theory. More precisely, the philosophy of the FBST is based on the duality be-
tween frequentist significance measures based on an incompatibility order defined in the
sample space, and the Bayesian e-value based on an incompatibility order defined in the
parameter space. Notice that a frequentist likelihood ratio test compares the supremum
of the likelihood restricted to the null set with the supremum of the likelihood under the
alternative to measure the inconsistency of the data with the null hypothesis. In the FBST,
the tangential set is based on the posterior distribution, allowing a Bayesian perspective.
Also, the tangential set is, as the name says, a set of values instead of a supremum under a
hypothesis, which produces a less subjective statement of evidence (Berger & Sellke, 1987).
Before the next section outlines the mathematical theory behind the FBST in more detail,
notice that the consequences of this philosophical basis are substantial: The quantity ev is
not a mere Bayesian counterpart to the frequentist p-value, but a genuine Bayesian pro-
cedure in the sense that it follows the likelihood principle (Basu, 1975; Berger & Wolpert,
1988; Birnbaum, 1962). As a consequence, among the advantages of using the FBST is:
• Researchers are allowed to make use of optional stopping. This implies that it is per-
mitted to stop recruiting participants or abort an experiment and report the results
when only a fraction of the observed data shows overwhelming evidence. Notice
that this behaviour results in severe problems when NHST and p-values are used.
For a review for psychologists see Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963), Kruschke
(2015) and Kruschke and Liddell (2018b).
• The interpretation of censored data (which is often observed in longitudinal studies
or clinical trials) is conceptually simplified (Berger & Wolpert, 1988). As a conse-
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quence of the likelihood principle, the likelihood contribution of a single observation
in an experiment where no censoring is possible is equal to the likelihood contribu-
tion of a single observation in an experiment where censoring is possible but did not
happen to the observation, see (Berger & Wolpert, 1988, Chapter 4).
• The results obtained do not depend on the researcher’s intentions (Kruschke, 2018).
These aspects are already appealing to practitioners. Besides, the FBST can be formally
derived as a Bayes rule, which means that it can be derived by minimising an appropriate
loss function (da Silva, Esteves, Fossaluza, Izbicki, & Wechsler, 2015; Madruga, Esteves,
& Wechsler, 2001; Madruga, Pereira, & Stern, 2003). Also, the FBST has logical properties
which are not met by both frequentist p-values and Bayes factors. We only mention two of
these here, but for more details see Stern (2003).
First, most (frequentist or Bayesian) hypothesis testing approaches try to express the
support for a sharp null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 via the probability of the null set. For a
sharp hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0, the null set is simply the point {θ0} which has Lebesgue
measure zero (Bauer, 2001). As noted by (Stern, 2003, p. 5), to prevent measure-theoretic
problems when assigning a prior probability to a set of measure zero, various statistical
tests reparameterize the hypothesis in a specific way and then use a probability measure
on the submanifold derived by reparameterizing the hypothesis in this specific way. As a
consequence, the probability measure used for quantifying the evidence does not operate
in the original parameter space. In contrast, the probability measure used with the FBST
does (?, Section 3).
Second, various approaches to sharp hypothesis testing use the nuisance parameter
elimination paradigm. For example, the Bayes factor BF01 in favor of H0 is the ratio of the
marginal likelihoods p(x|H0) and p(x|H1):
P(H0|x)
P(H1|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior odds
=
p(x|H0)
p(x|H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF01(x)
· P(H0)
P(H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior odds
However, the marginal likelihoods can be difficult to obtain in the presence of nuisance
parameters which are not of interest for the problem at hand. To obtain the marginal
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likelihood p(x|H1), these have to be integrated out
p(x|H1) =
∫
p(x|θ, H1)p(θ|H1)dθ
where the parameter θ is possible vector-valued. This quickly becomes cumbersome in
high-dimensional models and troubles inference further (Held & Sabane´s Bove´, 2014; Ru-
bin, 1984). In contrast, the FBST operates in the original parameter space and does not
need to eliminate nuisance parameters to be conducted (Pereira et al., 2008). This latter
property makes application of the FBST straightforward as will be shown in the examples
later.
1.2 The mathematical theory behind the FBST
The previous section gave an overview of the foundational aspects of the FBST. The ad-
herence to the likelihood principle is a substantial benefit of the FBST compared to NHST
which relies on p-values. Also, there are some conceptual simplifications over other in-
dices like Bayes factors or p-values. This section describes the mathematical theory behind
the FBST in more detail and reveals that these simplifications also have their price. Impor-
tantly, this section shows that in contrast to the Bayes factor, the FBST can not confirm a
research hypothesis. Via the FBST, one can only state evidence against a sharp null hypoth-
esis H0, which shows the similarity to the frequentist p-value.
Nevertheless, the FBST can be generalized into an extended framework which allows
for hypothesis confirmation (Esteves, Izbicki, Stern, & Stern, 2019). This wider framework
was constructed because precise hypotheses cannot be accepted by logically consistent
tests. Esteves et al. (2019) showed that this dilemma can be overcome by the use of prag-
matic versions of precise hypotheses, which allows a level of imprecision in the hypothesis
that is small relative to other experimental conditions. The introduction of pragmatic hy-
potheses in turn allows the evolution of scientific theories based on statistical hypothesis
testing and the FBST can be generalized into this theory.1
The FBST can be used with any standard parametric statistical model, where θ ∈ Θ ⊆
Rp is a (vector-valued) parameter of interest, p(x|θ) is the model likelihood and p(θ) is
1Notice the strong analogy to often proposed approaches of equivalence testing in contemporary math-
ematical psychology, see Lakens (2017); Lakens, Scheel, and Isager (2018), Kruschke (2018); Kruschke and
Liddell (2018a) or Liao, Midya, and Berg (2020).
7
the prior distribution for the parameter θ of interest. A sharp (or expressed equivalently,
precise) hypothesis H0 makes a statement about the parameter θ: Specifically, the null hy-
pothesis H0 states that θ lies in the so-called null set ΘH0 . For simple point null hypotheses
like H0 : θ = θ0 often used in practice this null set is just the single parameter value θ0,
so that the null set can be written as ΘH0 = {θ0}. As detailed in the previous section, the
approach of the FBST consists of stating the Bayesian evidence against H0, the e-value.
This value is the proposed Bayesian replacement of the traditional p-value. To construct
the e-value, Pereira et al. (2008) used the posterior surprise function s(θ) which is defined as
follows:
s(θ) :=
p(θ|x)
r(θ)
(1)
The surprise function s(θ) is the ratio of the posterior distribution p(θ|x) and a suitable
reference function r(θ). The first thing to note is that two important special cases are given by
a flat reference function r(θ) = 1 or any prior distribution p(θ) for the parameter θ. When a
flat reference function is selected the surprise function recovers the posterior distribution
p(θ|x). When any prior distribution is used as the reference function, one can interpret
parameter values θ with a surprise function value of one or larger, that is with s(θ) ≥ 1, as
being corroborated by observing the data x. In contrast, parameter values θ with a surprise
function s(θ) < 1 then indicate that they have not been corroborated by observing the data.
The next step is to calculate the supremum s∗ of the surprise function s(θ) over the null set
ΘH0 .
s∗ := s(θ∗) = sup
θ∈ΘH0
s(θ)
This supremum is subsequently used in combination with the tangential set, which has
been introduced in the last section already. Pereira et al. (2008) defined the tangential set
T (ν) to the sharp null hypothesis H0 as follows:
T (ν) := Θ \ T (ν) (2)
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In the above, T (ν) is given as
T (ν) := {θ ∈ Θ|s(θ) ≤ ν} (3)
Using the value ν = s∗, the tangential set T (ν) has precisely the interpretation discussed in
the previous section: T (s∗) then includes all parameter values θ which are either smaller
or equal to the supremum value s∗ of the surprise function s(θ) over the null set ΘH0 . As a
consequence of equation (3), the tangential set T (s∗) includes all parameter values θ which
are larger than the supremum s∗ of the surprise function over the null set ΘH0 .
Following the ideas presented in the previous section, the final step to obtain the e-
value is to define the cumulative surprise function W (ν)
W (ν) :=
∫
T (ν)
p(θ|x)dθ (4)
The cumulative surprise function W (ν) is the integral of the posterior distribution p(θ|x)
over all parameter values which have a surprise function value s(θ) ≤ ν. Again, setting
ν = s∗, W (s∗) becomes the integral of the posterior distribution p(θ|x) over T (s∗), which
is the integral of the posterior p(θ|x) over all parameter values which have a surprise func-
tion value s(θ) ≤ s∗. Finally, the Bayesian evidence against H0, the e-value against H0 is
calculated as
ev(H0) := W (s∗) (5)
where W (ν) := 1−W (ν). Figure 1 shows the single parts which are used in the FBST and
visualises the e-value ev(H0). The solid line shows the posterior distribution of the effect
size δ and is based on a Bayesian two-sample t-test (Kelter, 2020c). A flat reference function
r(δ) = 1 was used, and the solid line is the resulting posterior distribution p(δ|x) after
observing the data x. The supremum over the null set ΘH0 = {0} is s∗ = s(0), highlighted
as the blue point. The horizontal blue dashed line shows the boundary between T (0) and
T (0): Values with posterior density p(δ) > p(0) are in T (0), while values with p(δ) ≤ p(0)
are in T (0). The blue shaded area is W (0), the integral over the tangential set T (0) against
H0 : δ = 0, which is the e-value ev(H0) against H0; the red area is the integral W (0) over
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Figure 1: Visualisation of the FBST and the e-value ev(H0) against H0 : δ = 0 in a Bayesian
two-sample t-test, where δ is the effect size. A flat reference function r(δ) = 1 is used, and
the solid line is the resulting posterior distribution p(δ|x) after observing the data. The
supremum over the null set is s∗ = 0, highlighted as the blue point. The blue shaded
area is W (0), the integral over the tangential set T (0) of H0 : δ = 0, which is the e-value
ev(H0) against H0; the red area is the integral W (0) over T (0), which is the e-value ev(H0)
in favour of H0 : δ = 0
T (0), which is the e-value ev(H0) in favour of H0 : δ = 0. The resulting e-value against
H0 : δ = 0 is given as ev(H0) = 0.907, which is the amount of probability mass shaded
in blue in figure 1. Based on this value, there is considerable evidence against the null
hypothesis. Now, instead of flat reference function r(δ) = 1 it is also possible to choose
a proper prior distribution. Figure 2 visualises the same situation but now the reference
function was selected as a medium Cauchy prior C(0, 1), which is often recommended in
the setting of the Bayesian two-sample t-test (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson,
2009). In figure 2, the reference function is shown as the dashed black line. The surprise
function now does not become the posterior distribution. Instead, it is the ratio s(δ) =
p(δ|x)/r(δ), where r(δ) is the Cauchy prior.
Notice that although the situation seems quite similar to figure 1, the scaling on the
y-axis has changed. Also, the interpretation of the surprise function is now different. If
one would assume a Cauchy prior C(0, 1) on the effect size δ, parameters with a surprise
function value s(δ) ≥ 1 can be interpreted as being corroborated by the data when such a
prior distribution of the effect size is assumed. The resulting e-value against H0 : δ = 0
visualised as the shaded blue area is given as ev(H0) = 0.932.
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Figure 2: Visualisation of the FBST and the e-value ev(H0) against H0 : δ = 0 in a Bayesian
two-sample t-test, where δ is the effect size. A Cauchy reference function r(δ) = C(0, 1)
is used, and the solid line is the resulting surprise function p(δ|x)/r(δ) after observing the
data x. The supremum over the null set is s∗ = 0, highlighted as the blue point. The blue
shaded area is W (0), the integral over the tangential set T (0) against H0 : δ = 0, which is
the e-value ev against H0; the red area is the integral W (0) over T (0), which is the e-value
ev(H0) in favour of H0 : δ = 0
Formally, Pereira and Stern (1999) defined the e-value ev(H0) in support of H0 as
ev(H0) := 1− ev(H0) (6)
Nevertheless, notice that the Bayesian evidence in support of H0 (that is, the e-value
ev(H0)) can not be interpreted as evidence against H1. This is because H1 is not even a
sharp hypothesis, compare also with Definition 2.2 in Pereira et al. (2008).
Importantly, it is not possible to utilise the e-value ev(H0) to confirm the null hypothe-
sis H0. The reasons can be attributed to the fact that even when the posterior concentrates
around the true value θ0 of the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0, the posterior distribution’s
probability mass fluctuates around the true value according to the central limit theorem.
For details see Kelter (2020a). However, one can use ev(H0) to reject H0 if ev(H0) is suf-
ficiently small, and there are asymptotic arguments based on the distribution of ev(H0)
(Pereira et al., 2008, Section 5). Pereira et al. (2008) derived the distribution of the e-value
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as a Chi-square distribution
ev(H0) ∼ χ2k(||m−M ||2) (7)
where M and m are the posterior mode calculated over the entire parameter space Θ and
the posterior maximum restricted to ΘH0 (that is, s
∗). They showed that the p-value as-
sociated with the Bayesian evidence in support of H0, the e-value ev(H0), is the superior
tail of the χ2 density with k − h degrees of freedom, starting from −2λ(m0). Here, k and
h are the dimensions of the parameter space Θ and the null set ΘH0 . m0 is the observed
value and λ(t) = ln l(t) where l(t) = L(t)/L(M) is the relative likelihood. Now, the p-value
associated with the Bayesian e-value ev(H0) is then given as
pv0 = 1− χ2k−h(−2λ(m0)) (8)
Notice that this latter p-value has a frequentist interpretation, while equivalently, the p-
value based on equation (7) can be expressed as
ev0 = χ
2
k(||m0 −M0||2) (9)
which is interpreted as a Bayesian significance value. As a consequence, when observing
m0 and M0 which are the maximum restricted to ΘH0 (that is, s
∗) and the posterior mode,
one only needs to calculate the euclidian distance d0 = ||m0 −M0||2 and obtain the value
of the χ2k distribution of this distance. Then, a usual threshold of the χ
2
k distribution can be
used to reject the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 or not.
There is also the option to use the standardized e-value sev(H0), as defined in (Borges
& Stern, 2007, Section 2.2) and in (Pereira & Stern, 2020, Section 3.3), which is the quan-
tity that constitutes the best analogue to a frequentist p-value. The standardized e-value is
defined as: sev(H0) = Fk−h(F−1k (ev)), where F
−1
k is the generalised inverse of the cumula-
tive distribution function of the χ2k distribution with k degrees of freedom, and Fk−h is the
cumulative distribution function of the χ2k−h distribution. sev(H0) can be interpreted as
the probability of obtaining less evidence than ev(H0) against the null hypothesis H0. Us-
ing the relationship sev(H0) = 1−sev(H0), sev(H0) can be interpreted as the probability of
12
obtaining ev(H0) or more evidence against H0. Notice the strong analogy to the frequen-
tist p-value, which is why this standardised e-value sev(H0) can be used as a replacement
for frequentist p-values if desired. In the examples, we therefore report the raw Bayesian
evidence against H0, that is, ev(H0), the normal p-value associated with ev(H0), that is,
ev0, and also the standardized e-value sev(H0). Notice that when a p-value replacement is
desired, the latter quantity sev(H0) is most suitable, for details see Pereira and Stern (2020).
In summary, the FBST and the e-value were invented to precisely mimic a frequentist
significance test of a sharp hypothesis. The e-value ev(H) can be interpreted as a direct
replacement of the frequentist p-value and can only be used to reject a null hypothesis H0
of interest, either based on a continuous interpretation (which we follow here) or based
on the asymptotic arguments outlined above. If the asymptotic arguments are used, the
standardized e-value sev(H0) has the strongest similarity to a frequentist p-value, while
ev0 has a more Bayesian flavour. Notice, however, that the confirmation of a research
hypothesis via ev(H) is not possible via the FBST (Kelter, 2020a; Pereira & Stern, 2020).
2 Examples and illustrations of the FBST for psychological meth-
ods
This section provides two examples which show how to apply the FBST in practice. The
first example is a Bayesian two-sample t-test (Rouder et al., 2009). The two-sample t-test
is one of the most widely used statistical procedures carried out in psychological research
(Nuijten, Hartgerink, van Assen, Epskamp, & Wicherts, 2016) and as a consequence allows
readers to apply the FBST on their own t-tests if desired.
The second example is based on the linear regression model. Linear regression is also
an important statistical method in psychology and the biomedical sciences (Faraway, 2016;
van Erp, Oberski, & Mulder, 2019), and here we focus on testing if a regression coefficient
βj for a specific predictor is zero or not. That is, we test H0 : βj = 0 against H1 : βj 6= 0 for
a regression coefficient βj .
While we prefer a continuous interpretation of the e-value in the same way we prefer a
continuous interpretation of p-values we also provide the resulting p-values ev0 associated
with the e-value ev(H0) and the standardized e-values sev(H0) for the interested reader.
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Note however that the continuous quantification of evidence against H0 based solely on
ev(H0) is not anymore arbitrary than the decision based on the p-value ev0 associated with
ev(H0) or the standardized e-value sev(H0): In the latter case, the decision threshold used
for separating significant from non-significant p-values (like ev0 < .05 or sev(H0) < .05) is
as arbitrary as using a threshold like ev(H0) > 0.95 on ev(H0) (or ev(H0)) directly.
We encourage readers to reproduce all analyses via the provided replication script,
which is available at the Open Science Foundation at https://osf.io/8rg2k/.
2.1 The FBST in the setting of the Bayesian two-sample t-test
In the first example we use data from Wagenmakers et al. (2015), who replicated the study
of Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012).2 In their paper called “Turning the Hands of Time”,
Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) conducted a study in which participants were split into
two groups and each group had to fill out a personality questionnaire measuring the open-
ness to new experiences. The first group had to roll a kitchen roll counterwise while com-
pleting the questionnaire. In contrast, the second group had to roll the kitchen roll clock-
wise. The personality questionnaire’s mean score was recorded for each participant and
these are compared via the Bayesian two-sample t-test of Rouder et al. (2009). Formally,
we test the hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 against H1 : δ 6= 0, which is equivalent to H0 : µ1 = µ2
against H1 : µ1 6= µ2 due to the definition of δ, compare Cohen (1988).
Figure 3a shows the resulting prior-posterior plot of the effect size δ for the Bayesian
two-sample t-test based on the observed data in both groups. The recommended medium
Cauchy prior C(0,
√
2/2) was assigned to the effect size (Rouder et al., 2009). The poste-
rior distribution has moved from the prior distribution which is centred at zero towards
negative effect sizes and the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) interval is given as
[−0.50, 0.23]. However, the resulting Bayes factor BF01 in favour of the null hypothesis
H0 : δ = 0 is given as BF01 = 3.71, which signals moderate evidence for the null hypothe-
sis according to van Doorn et al. (2019).
The FBST was conducted with the same Cauchy prior as reference function, that is
r(δ) = C(0,
√
2/2). Figure 3b visualises the e-value ev(H0) against H0 : δ = 0 as the blue
shaded area under the surprise function. Notice that the surprise function is not identical
2The data is freely available in the built-in data library of the open-source statistical software JASP, freely
available at www.jasp-stats.org.
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Figure 3: Prior-posterior plot and FBST for the Bayesian two-sample t-test for the kitchen
rolls dataset
to the posterior, but now equals the ratio s(δ) = p(δ|x)/r(δ) of the posterior distribution
p(δ|x) and the Cauchy prior r(δ) = C(0,√2/2).
The e-value is obtained via numerical optimisation and integration as ev(H0) = 0.57.
This shows that only a little more than half of the posterior distribution’s parameter values
attain higher surprise function values than δ0 = 0, which shows that there is not much
evidence against H0. Based on the e-value against H0 one would therefore not reject H0.
Notice however that in contrast to the Bayes factor, confirmation of H0 is not possible.
The e-value in favour of H0 is given as ev(H0) = 0.43, and the corresponding p-value
ev0 based on k = 3 (Θ consists of two means µ1 and µ2 which are free to vary and the
standard deviation, and ΘH0 consists only of one difference µ1 − µ2 which is fixed to the
value zero and the standard deviation), m0 = 1.67, M0 = −0.13 and d0 = ||m0 −M0||2 =
3.26 is computed as
ev0 = χ
2
2(3.26) = 0.6463
Here,M0 was obtained via numerical optimisation andm0 is simply the posterior density’s
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Figure 4: Prior-posterior plot and FBST for the Bayesian two-sample t-test for the simulated
data example
value at δ0 = 0. The resulting p-value is not significant when the threshold ev0 < 0.05
is applied, so the conclusion is identical to the continuous interpretation of the e-value
above and H0 is not rejected. Based on the standardized e-value against H0, which is
sev(H0) = 0.0945, the null hypothesis would not be rejected, too. A standard two-sample
t-test would produce a p-value of 0.4542, also producing a non-significant result.
Figure 4 shows a second Bayesian t-test. This time, data in both groups have been sim-
ulated. In the first group, n = 50 observations were generated according to the N (0, 1.5)
distribution and in the second group, n = 50 observations were generated according to
theN (0.8, 3.2) distribution. As a consequence, the resulting true effect size δt according to
Cohen (1988) is given as
δt =
0− 0.8√
(1.52 + 3.22)/2
≈ −0.34
which equals a small effect. The posterior is shown in figure 4a.
The resulting Bayes factor BF01 = 0.84 is indecisive (BF10 = 1.19) and the 95% HPD is
given as [−0.74, 0.02]. Again, a medium Cauchy prior was used on δ as previously. Here,
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the Bayes factor fails to detect the existing small effect.
The FBST was conducted again with the medium Cauchy reference function r(δ) =
C(0,
√
2/2) and the resulting e-value against H0 is given as ev(H0) = 0.96 which signals
strong evidence against H0 : δ = 0. Figure 4b visualises the e-value again as the blue
shaded region under the posterior.
Considering the e-value ev(H0) in support of H0, it is obtained as ev(H0) = 0.04, and
the corresponding p-value ev0 based on k = 2, m0 = 0.38, M0 = −0.35 and d0 = 0.02
is calculated as ev0 = 0.01. Based on a threshold ev0y0.05 one would, as a consequence,
reject the null hypothesisH0 based on the p-value ev0 associated with the Bayesian e-value
ev(H0) in support of H0.
2.2 The FBST in the setting of Bayesian linear regression
As a second example, we showcase the application of the FBST in the standard Bayesian
linear regression model (van Erp et al., 2019). In the example, we use student performance
data which were collected by Paulo Cortez and Alice Silva at the University of Minho
in Portugal (Cortez & Silva, 2008). The data can be openly accessed from the Univer-
sity of California-Irvine’s machine learning repository (Dua & Graff, 2019) at http://
archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Student+Performance. We use the math
performance data which contains math exam scores and multiple predictors from n = 395
Portuguese students.3 Our goal here is to study the influence of the predictors on the first-
trimester math grade of each student, which ranges from 0 to 20. For illustration purposes,
we study the influence of a small subset of the predictors which consists of the gender, the
age (ranging from 15 to 22), the time needed to travel to school, the weekly study time
and whether the student is in a relationship. The daily travel and weekly study time are
measured in four levels where for the daily travel time, 1 = less than 15 minutes, 2 = 15 to
30 minutes, 3 = 30 minutes to one hour, and 4 = more than one hour. For the weekly study
time, 1 = less than two hours, 2 = two to five hours, 3 = five to ten hours, and 4 = more than
ten hours.
For all regression coefficients β, we choose a normal prior: βj ∼ N (0, 1) for j = 1, ..., 5.
3A list of all 30 predictors available for predicting students’ math exam score is given at http://
archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Student+Performance, which includes variables like the stu-
dent’s family size, her free time after school or her health status.
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Table 1: Posterior estimates of the Bayesian linear regression model of the Student’s math
performance dataset of Cortez & Silva (2008)
Estimates mean sd 10% 50% 90% Rˆ
(Intercept) 11.6 2.3 8.7 11.6 14.5 1.00
sex 1.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 1.00
age -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 1.00
traveltime -0.4 0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 1.00
studytime 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.00
relationship -0.2 0.4 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 1.00
sigma 3.2 0.1 3.1 3.2 3.4 1.00
For the intercept, we select β0 ∼ N (0, 10), which is the default weakly informative prior,
compare Gabry and Goodrich (2020). For the standard deviation σ, we choose the de-
fault weakly informative σ ∼ exp(1) prior, compare also Gabry and Goodrich (2020). The
hyperparameters were selected based on a prior-predictive simulation which is shown in
figure 5.
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Figure 5: Prior predictive distribution for the Bayesian linear regression model of the Stu-
dent’s math performance dataset of Cortez & Silva (2008)
Based on the prior predictive distribution, the selected priors are reasonable in the
sense that it is plausible that they could have produced the observed data.
Table 1 shows the resulting posterior estimates based on 2500 posterior parameter draws
obtained via the rstanarm R package (Goodrich, Gabry, Ali, & Brilleman, 2020). Figure
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6 shows the traceplots of the posterior Markov chain draws for each of the marginal pos-
teriors of the regression coefficients βj , j = 0, ..., 5. Based on figure 6, all chains are well-
behaved and have converged to the posterior. The Rˆ Gelman-Rubin-shrink factor given
in table 1 is also one for all predictors and signals convergence to the posterior (Gelman &
Rubin, 1992).
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Figure 6: Traceplots of the Markov chains for the marginal posteriors of the regression coef-
ficients in the Bayesian linear regression model of the Student’s math performance dataset
of Cortez & Silva (2008). romanticyes are the values for the regression coefficients for
the predictor relationship when set to one (student is in a romantic relationship), and sexM
are the values for the regression coefficients for the predictor sex when set to one (student
is male)
To apply the FBST, the marginal posterior distributions of each of the regression coeffi-
cients βj , j = 1, ..., 6 are used which are shown in figure 7. Based on these posteriors one
immediately sees that some covariates influence the first-trimester math grade stronger
than others: For example, the coefficient for gender is centred around the value βj = 1,
showing a beneficial influence, while the predictors for relationship and traveltime are
shifted towards negative values, indicating that student’s in a relationship or with a longer
travel time to school perform worse. However, to quantify the evidence againstH0 : βj = 0
for j = 1, ..., 5 we apply the FBST in each case, using a flat reference function r(β) = 1 (so
that the surprise function becomes the posterior). For the five predictors, the resulting e-
values ev(H0) againstH0 : βj = 0 and the standardized e-values sev(H0) are given in table
19
Table 2: e-values ev(H0), associated p-values ev0, and standardized e-values sev(H0) for
the FBSTs of the regression coefficients in the Bayesian linear regression model of the Stu-
dent’s math performance dataset of Cortez & Silva (2008). Eight-digit precision is used to
highlight the differences between the values.
Predictor ev(H0) ev0 sev(H0)
sex (male) 0.996 0.00529900 0.00000408
age 0.658 0.22538084 0.00495210
traveltime 0.881 0.00228437 0.00069724
studytime 1.000 0.00105736 0.00000000
relationship (yes) 0.346 0.01191338 0.02464463
2. Based on this continuous quantification of the evidence against H0 : βj = 0 one would
reject the null hypothesis of no influence for the predictors sex and study time. Also, there
is some evidence that the travel time plays a role while the age and relationship status are
less relevant for predicting first-trimester math performance. The associated p-values ev0
with the Bayesian e-values ev(H0) in support of H0 : βj = 0 are also shown in table 2.
When the significance threshold ev0 < 0.05 is used, the predictors sex, travel time, study
time and relationship are significant.
Notice that the continuous quantification via ev(H0) is better interpretable: For ex-
ample, the difference in p-values ev0 ≈ 0.001 associated with the predictor studytime
and ev0 ≈ 0.002 associated with the predictor traveltime seems tiny (the same holds
for the standardized e-values sev(H0)), but the difference between ev(H0) = 1.000 and
ev(H0) = 0.882, the Bayesian e-values against H0 for the predictors studytime and travel-
time, reveals that there is a non-negligible difference between both posterior distributions.
This is also shown in figure 7: The marginal posterior distribution of the predictor
studytime shows that the regression coefficient of this predictor is certainly positive a
posteriori, while the marginal posterior of the predictor traveltime shows a considerable
amount of probabiliy mass which indicates that the regression coefficient could also be
zero or even positive. Notice also that the p-value ev0 (and sev(H0)) relies on asymptotic
arguments which can be questioned if sample sizes are only moderate.
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Figure 7: Marginal posterior distribution’s for the regression coefficients β1, ..., β5 for the
Bayesian linear regression model of the Student’s math performance dataset of Cortez &
Silva (2008)
3 Discussion
Hypothesis testing remains a substantial statistical method in psychological research. While
the problems of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) are still being debated widely,
few appealing alternatives exist to the current status quo.
In this paper, we provided a tutorial on the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and
the e-value, the Bayesian evidence value which was originally developed by Pereira and
Stern (1999) to test a sharp null hypothesis against its alternative. The foundations and
the mathematical theory of the FBST were outlined and it was shown that the FBST is a
fully Bayesian alternative to traditional significance tests which rely on p-values. There are
multiple appealing properties which make the FBST an attractive alternative to NHST and
p-values: First, the FBST is a formal Bayes rule for an appropriate loss function. Second,
it offers a seamless transition from NHST and p-values to Bayesian data analysis, which
eases the interpretation for practitioners who are accustomed to p-values and requires little
methodological changes. Third, the FBST is an advanced methodological procedure which
can be applied to several areas due to its simple computational basis. Fourth, the FBST can
be used with the asymptotic arguments detailed in this paper to use the Bayesian evidence
value in support of a sharp null hypothesis to calculate a traditional p-value for rejecting
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the null hypothesis, if desired.
In this tutorial, we showed via two examples of widely used statistical methods in
psychological research how the FBST can be used in practice. The first example detailed
how to apply the FBST in the setting of the two-sample t-test for a flat and Cauchy reference
function. The second example highlighted the FBST in the setting of the Bayesian linear
regression model and showed how to test the regression coefficients for the existence of
an effect. Notice that both examples were based on completely different statistical models
and different software implementations, which shows how easy it is to apply the FBST.4
However, there are also some limitations of the method: First, analytical solutions are
not available in most cases and as a consequence, a minimal requirement to apply the
FBST is that the posterior distribution can be obtained via simulation, for example via
MCMC sampling. Then, the surprise function can be approximated via kernel estimators
or spline-based approaches. Luckily, this is no severe limitation as most realistic Bayesian
psychological models are obtained via advanced MCMC sampling techniques in everyday
practice (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b; van Doorn, Ly, Marsman, & Wagenmakers, 2020; van
Doorn et al., 2019; Wagenmakers et al., 2010). A more severe limitation of the FBST is that
is can not be used to confirm a research hypothesis, in contrast to the Bayes factor or the
region of practical equivalence (Kelter, 2020a). However, the FBST can be generalized into
an extended framework which allows for hypothesis confirmation, and this is an active
topic of research (Esteves et al., 2019; Kelter, 2020a).
However, the FBST is an innovative method which has, next to its appealing theoret-
ical properties, clearly demonstrated to perform better than frequentist significance test-
ing (Kelter, 2020a; Madruga et al., 2003; Pereira et al., 2008; Stern, 2003; ?). To our best
knowledge, it has not been used so far in the psychological sciences and should be of wide
interest to a broad range of researchers in psychology. We hope that this paper fosters dis-
cussion about the use and suitability of the FBST for psychological research and practice,
and enables researchers to apply the FBST to their own data sets and models of interest.
4While the posterior distribution of the Bayesian two-sample t-test of Rouder et al. (2009) was obtained via
the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2018), the rstanarm package (Goodrich et al., 2020) was used
to obtain the posterior for the Bayesian linear regression model.
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